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!is is a watershed time in the Court’s history. You have 
World War II. You have McCarthyism. You have the Cold 
War. You have the civil rights struggles. !ere’s tension 
between national security, national identity, free speech, 
individual rights. And it falls into the lap of these nine 
Justices to sort it all out1.
!e main "eld of my study concerns the role of the Supreme Court in American 
legal and political system. My research frequently focuses on the case law, especially 
on some of the most important cases in the Court’s history, and on their in#uence 
on the whole of political, economic, and social relations of the country. I personally 
believe that American federal judges – among whom the most in#uential are the 
Justices of the Supreme Court – have gained more power than the Framers of the 
Constitution agreed to give them. Such situation occurred mostly because of the 
creation of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court, which allowed the 
judiciary to determine the contitutionality of acts created by the other branches of 
government2. It led directly to judicial interpretation of the Constitution and formed 
1 Joan Biskupic, !e Supreme Court, Program !ree, !irteen/WNET New York, PBS, 
February 2007.
2 In 1803 Justices decided a famous landmark case Marbury v. Madison. !e presiding 
Chief Justice John Marshall used the case to increase powers of the judiciary. He reasoned 
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a strong checks-and-balances mechanism on the side of federal judiciary. Beginning 
from 1803, and especially in the 20th century, one can observe how the Supreme 
Court reshaped the meaning of many important political, social and cultural issues, 
which in!uenced lives of the people of the United States. Especially in the 50s and 
60s of the 20th century the Justices became very active in telling their citizens how to 
behave and what to do. "erefore the aim of this article is to analyze the most impor-
tant Supreme Court’s decisions made during di#cult times of the Cold War, especially 
in the dimension of social fears and expectations. It seems very interesting and chal-
lenging to $nd out whether there was a direct in!uence of the Cold War problems 
on the Court’s jurisdiction. It is important to notice that the analyzed period covers 
activity of so-called Vinson Court (1946–1953) and Warren Court (1953–1969), so 
it does not concern the whole timeline of Cold War events, until the beginning of 
the 90s of 20th century. Such limitation is necessary to wholly examine $rst twenty 
years of the Cold War, because one can observe at this time high tensions in the 
Court and among the society, as well as di%erent approaches of the Justices to the 
issues in question. "e problem of fear versus security relates directly to the issues 
confronted by the Justices under the leaderships of Frederick M. Vinson and Earl 
Warren, yet does not necessarily mean that the next Court (so-called Burger Court, 
1969–1986) was not engaged in these issues at all. 
Just few years a&er the end of the World War II, the United States faced the period 
of con!icts and tensions with the Soviet Union, which was named the Cold War3. "e 
competition between the two former allies dominated international relations for over 
forty years, producing some military con!icts which did not, however, turn into 
worldwide wars4. "e mentioned period led also to creation of new intelligence agen-
cies (American CIA v. Russian KGB), as well as major defense alliances (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation v. the Warsaw Pact). "e international tensions could 
not take place without in!uencing domestic issues, such as social, economic, and 
cultural relations, especially in the dimension of surveillance and individual rights. 
that the Constitution was the supreme law of the land and had to be followed by every branch 
of government. He stated that the judiciary had the right to interpret the law which came 
before it, and, following the supremacy clause, judges had to decide whether that law was 
consistent with the Constitution. Marshall con$rmed that it was “emphatically the duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law was” – Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
3 "e term was $rst used by President Truman’s advisers, Walter Lippmann and Bernard 
Baruch, in 1947. Fred Halliday, Cold War [in:] e Oxford Companion to the Politics of the 
World, ed. Joel Krieger, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
4 "e most important con!icts were: the Korean War (1950–1953), the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (1962), and the Vietnam War (1964–1975). See: Norman Friedman, Con!ict and Strat-
egy in the Cold War. U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2007.
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Ideologically, communism became the fundamental threat to American values of 
capitalism and democracy. Fears concerning communist threat to national security 
caused some controversial activities of U.S. politicians, the most famous of whom was 
Senator Joseph McCarthy. His anticommunist o!ensive, called sometimes the Red 
Image5, was basically aimed to "ght espionage and subversion against the United States, 
and led to creation of numerous legal norms and regulations. For the "rst time since 
the infamous laws of 1798 (Alien and Sedition Acts6) the state decided to lawfully put 
people in jail for their political opinions. In mid-50s of the 20th century Congress had 
already passed the following laws: criminalizing membership in the Communist Party 
of the United States (Communist Control Act7), investigating persons engaged in un-
American activities and authorizing concentration camps in ‘emergency situations’ 
(McCarran Internal Security Act8), requiring professionals to sign a#davits swearing 
that they were not members of the Communist party (Labor-Management Relations 
Act, known as Ta!-Hartley Act9), and requiring non-citizen adult residents to register 
with the U.S. government (Alien Registration Act, known also as Smith Act10). Existence 
of such legal provisions meant prosecutions and deportations of many so-called 
radicals, loyalty oath requirements, and free-wheeling investigations by several con-
gressional committees11, which theoretically seemed to violate fundamental indi-
vidual rights and freedoms of the society. However, one cannot unequivocally decide 
whether such actions were against U.S. constitution, without a legally valid opinion 
of the court; in American political reality it means the opinion of the Supreme Court. 
$erefore let us take a look at some major decisions of the U.S. highest judicial tribu-
nal as goes for the constitutionality of the laws in question.
$e Cold War period started about 1947, when the Supreme Court was led by 
Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson. Vinson had been nominated to the post by 
President Harry S. Truman a year before, thus con"rming close political ties between 
the two gentlemen12. $e Supreme Court during his era (1946–1953) was o%en called 
 5 See: Les K. Adler, "e Red Image: American Attitudes toward Communism in the Cold 
War Era. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991.
 6 See: Geo!rey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, “Supreme Court Historical Society”, 
vol. 28, issue 2, 2003, pp. 217–219.
 7 50 U.S.C. 841 (1954).
 8 50 U.S.C. 781 (1950).
 9 29 U.S.C.A. 141 (1947).
10 18 U.S.C. 2385 (1940).
11 $e most notorious of the committees was the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities (HUAC). See: Kermit L. Hall (ed.), "e Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court 
of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 198–199. 
12 He acted as a Secretary of Treasury under President Harry S. Truman (1945–1946). 
Later, while being the Chief Justice he considered returning to the political post in the presi-
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a transition court, because it was placed between the Court under Chief Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone, consisting of Justices who were economic liberals dedicated to 
protecting constitutional liberties, and the Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
known for its aggressive expansion of individual liberties and civil rights13. From the 
variety of cases decided by the Vinson Court, most o!en the Justices adjudicated in 
cases concerning the legality of governmental actions against individuals who claimed 
that their basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution had been violated. 
A few disputes that seem crucial for the mentioned topic prove that the Court gen-
erally upheld actions undertaken by the federal government. 
"e #rst case worth analysing is American Communications Association v. Douds14 
where the Supreme Court considered constitutionality of the Ta!-Hartley Act. "e 
Justices, basing on the Commerce Clause rather than national security arguments, 
stated that Communists could engage in di$erent kinds of subversive actions (such 
as industrial sabotage or political strikes), and such actions could lead to weakening 
of national economy. "erefore the congressional Act was made in case of actions 
aimed to harm U.S. economy and the government’s interest in safeguarding the nation 
from political and economic crisis was more important than violation of rights of 
individuals. According to Chief Justice Vinson, when a contest between the First 
Amendment liberties and imperatives of national security occured, national security 
always had to win15. Other famous decision of that time was the opinion in Dennis 
v. United States16, a case against eleven people accused of conspiracy and infringement 
of the Smith Act. "e Act made it unlawful to conspire, to teach and advocate the 
destruction of the United States government and the Court found the defendants 
guilty of teaching communist ideology and actively advocacing its ideas. According 
to the Justices, particularly the communist advocacy was dangerous for the U.S. 
government and had to be punished, what meant a%rming the constitutionality of 
Smith Act. Chief Justice Vinson, despite belief that the Communist movement was 
too small and weak to overthrow the government, agreed with the majority of Justices, 
for whom national security was in danger because of the existence of the ideology 
dential administration. See: Linda C. Gugin, James E. St.Clair, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson of 
Kentucky: A Political Biography, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002, p. 156–230.
13 Michal R. Belknap, e Vinson Court: Justices, Rulings, Legacy, Supreme Court Hand-
books Series, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004, p. 3.
14 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
15 Christopher Tomlins (ed.), e United States Supreme Court: the Pursuit of Justice, New 
York: Houghton Mi&in Company, 2005, p. 270. 
16 341 U.S. 494 (1951). For more on the case see: William M. Wiecek, e Legal Founda-
tions of Domestic Anticommunism: the Background of Dennis v. United States, “"e Supreme 
Court Review”, 2002, p. 375–434. 
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in question. Similar decisions were made in cases Knau! v. Shaughnessy17 and Bailey 
v. Richardson18 and led to persecutions of people suspected of conspiracy with the 
hated communist regime. By the end of 1952 one hundred twenty-six communist 
activists were indicted, of whom ninety-three were convicted.19 Not all of these 
convictions were directly a!rmed by the Court, nevertheless it was more than vis-
ible that the atmosphere within the highest judicial tribunal of the state was very 
anti-communist.
Perhaps one of the most controversial decisions of that time was Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Rosenberg v. United States20. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were accused of 
spying on the United States by conveying national security information to the Soviet 
Union, and they were sentenced to death. Trial judge Irving R. Kaufman believed 
that the defendants had committed a crime worse than murder, and blamed them 
for the American deaths during the Korean War, as well as for the future deaths in 
case of the outbreak of global atomic war. Such argumentation was upheld by the 
Justices of the Supreme Court, however, there was a lot of vagueness in the Court’s 
decision and in the circumstances of the trial. Controversial was the exact nature of 
the secrets passed to the Soviets, cotroversial was the behaviour of judges and pros-
ecutors during the trial, and controversial was the legal basis for imposing the death 
penalty (the question whether the judgement was based on the Atomic Energy Act 
or maybe the Espionage Act).21 Never before had capital punishment been imposed 
on anyone convicted in peacetime of espionage.22 Whatever the contemporary feel-
ings about the case may be, it is a fact that during the Vinson Court’s era several legal 
disputes took place resulting in strenghtening of the national security by the highest 
judicial tribunal of the United States. 
"e above mentioned precedents show Vinson Court’s reluctance to rule against 
U.S. government’s actions falling into the category of #ghting the Red Image. Curi-
ously enough, this reluctance was visible in most of Vinson’s decisions. For example 
in the famous case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer23, when most of the 
Justices denied presidential seizure of the country’s steel mills during the Korean 
17 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
18 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
19 Stephen J. Whit#eld, "e Culture of the Cold War, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1991, p. 49.
20 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
21 Public Law 585, 49th Congress (1946); Ch. 30, title I, par. 3, 40 Stat. 219 (1917). For 
more on the case and its legacy see: Michael E. Parrish, Cold War Justice: the Supreme Court 
and the Rosenbergs, “American Historical Review”, vol. 82, no. 4, 1977, p. 805–842. 
22 Stephen J. Whit#eld, "e Culture…, op.cit., p. 32. 
23 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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War, the Chief Justice wrote a dissenting opinion in which he backed the President. 
According to government, a strike in steel companies could have hampered the 
economic situation of the country, therefore the Chief of State had power to seize 
the steel mills. Most of the Justices opposed such interpretation of the Constitution, 
con!rming lawmaking powers of the Congress, not the President. Most of them, but 
not Vinson. As constitutionalist Peter Irons observes “Vinson would not deny Tru-
man any powers, making his vote as predictable as the sunrise”24. 
When Frederick M. Vinson died, the Court under the leadership of a new Chief 
Justice, Earl Warren, changed the attitude, especially towards espionage and subver-
sion cases. Although the Warren Court (1953–1969) did not focus exclusively on the 
problems of national security threats, it adjudicated in a few important cases that 
raised the issue in question. Decisions of 1955, 1956 and 1957 revealed the judicial 
need to protect rights and freedoms of the individuals discriminated by the 
wrongdoings of the U.S. government. In Peters v. Hobby25 and Cole v. Young26 the 
Court changed convictions of employees discharged under the ‘loyalty-security 
program’ and of communist activists for violation of state sedition laws. Other 
important cases in that dimension were Watkins v. United States27 and Yates v. United 
States28. In Watkins the Justices prohibited congressional committees (including 
HUAC) from asking questions which would be irrelevant to legislation that these 
committees were considering to become law. Yates seems very crucial because for 
the !rst time the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of California Communist 
leaders under the Smith Act29. Furthermore, it was the !rst case in which the Justices 
ruled that a criminal prosecution for advocacy had to be of some future action, not 
for belief that something in the future was desirable.
In the early 60s of the 20th century the Red Image phobia diminished – it meant 
less governmental actions against individuals threatening national security and less 
cases brought to the courts by victims of such actions. It did not, however, mean that 
the Supreme Court had no in"uence on the civil rights issues. Quite the opposite, 
the number of decisions concerning individual rights and freedoms proved to prevail 
over other social and political aspects regulated by the federal judiciary. From its 
very beginning the Warren Court demonstrated a strong desire to uphold and sustain 
24 Peter Irons, A People’s History of the Supreme Court: the Men and Women Whose Cas-
es and Decisions Have Shaped Our Constitution, New York: Penguin Books, 2000, p. 367.
25 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
26 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
27 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
28 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
29 Over one hundred !#y people were indicted for violation of the Smith Act from 1951 
to 1957. See: e Oxford Companion…, ed. Kermit L. Hall, op.cit., p. 933–934.
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some of the most fundamental individual rights giving them a new constitutional 
meaning. !anks to judicial review, con"rmed strongly in the opinion to the case 
Cooper v. Aaron30 the Supreme Court confronted the issues of race, gender and 
religion, thus expanding the meaning of some civil rights and freedoms (i.e. freedom 
of conscience, equal justice under law or basic rights of the accused in criminal 
proceedings). Furthermore, judicial review became the strongest argument in Court’s 
opinions protecting individual liberties from government’s oppression: i.e. when 
Governor Orville Faubus of Arkansas challenged the Court’s authority to bind the 
states to its interpretation of the Constitution, Justices produced the mentioned 
Cooper decision a#rming Court’s role as the "nal arbiter of what the Constitution 
means.31 However, it was not the Cooper precedent for which Warren Court was to 
be remembered.
!e milestone case which helped to establish legal equality among races in 
American society was of course the famous Brown v. Board of Education32. Since the 
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson black children could not attend schools for white 
children due to regulations forming segregation in public facilities. In the late 40s 
and early 50s of the 20th century the National Association for the Advancement of 
Coloured People (NAACP) developed "ve segregation cases, one of which was 
Brown33. !e cases in question showed sharp divisions between the Justices of the 
Court, and it was Chief Justice’s role to convince all members of the Court to achieve 
a proper and unanimous verdict. He was aware of that fact admitting that “he could 
not escape the feeling that no matter how much the Court wanted to avoid the issue, 
it had to face it. !e Court had "nally arrived at the place where it had to determine 
whether segregation was allowable in public schools.”34 In 1954, speaking for an 
unanimous Court, Warren stated that any kind of separation led to unequality which 
was forbidden by U.S. Constitution. He proved that segregation process impaired 
the motivation of African-American children to learn and that separate educational 
facilities were inherently unequal. Justices abolished the unfamous separate but equal 
rule created 58 years earlier in the Plessy precedent, because it meant unequality for 
minorities, especially in the context of public education. As a result, particular states 
had to resign from enacting laws that promoted any kind of racial separation and 
30 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
31 !e Oxford Companion…, ed. Kermit L. Hall, p. 1070.
32 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33 !e United States Supreme Court…, (ed.) Christopher Tomlins, op.cit., p. 278–279.
34 From Warren’s Brown conference. See: Bernard Schwartz, !e History of the Supreme 
Court, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 291–295. For more on Warren and Brown 
see: Michal R. Belknap, !e Supreme Court under Earl Warren, 1953–1969, Columbia: Uni-
versity of South Carolina Press, 2005. 
165e U.S. Supreme Court and the Cold War: Fear v. Security. 
segregation, what proved a very complicated process. For example, to ensure that 
the Court’s decision would come into e!ect, President Dwight Eisenhower (not fully 
convinced about that) ordered federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas so that black 
children could enter the school. On that day, the President addressed the nation and 
explained that his duty to uphold the ruling of the Supreme Court was “inescap-
able”35. On one hand, it shows high respect and esteem of other branches of govern-
ment towards the Court’s rulings and on the other it proves social reluctance to 
follow it’s decisions; reluctance which did not last long. It is important to mention 
that the Brown decision not only banned school segregation but also became 
a foundation for several decisions abolishing the segregation in other public places, 
such as transportation, recreational, o"cial and eating facilities. Brown precedent 
had been awaited for a long time by the majority of Americans (especially 
Afro-Americans), however, the only political body that was able to change the doc-
trine of unequality was the Supreme Court. Looking at this point of view one may 
con#rm rightness of the words of Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson who once 
stated, that the Supreme Court’s decisons were not #nal because they were infallible, 
but they were infallible because they were #nal36. 
A$er the Brown case the Warren Court confronted other important aspects of 
individual rights in public schools. At the beginning of the 60s freedom of religion 
in schools became a major issue and the Court decided to confront it. In Engel 
v. Vitale37 the Justices were asked a question whether reading of a non-denominational 
prayer in school violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution. In a 6–1 opinion the Court admitted that introduction of any kind of 
prayer in schools was unconstitutional, because it established a state-approved 
religion. Similarly a year later in Abington School District v. Schempp38 the Justices 
removed Bible verse recitation from public schools. According to Pennsylvania law, 
public school students were required to attend classes where they had to read some 
parts of the Bible. %e Supreme Court ruled that such law was unconstitutional 
because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by 
forcing young people to participate in religious ceremonies. Both decisions show 
that the aim of the federal judiciary was to stop any kinds of state-based control over 
religious issues, and this direction was followed by next generations of Justices. 
35 Chester J. Pach, Elmo Richardson, e Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1991, p. 153.
36 Brown v. Allen 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
37 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
38 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Apart from the freedom of religion cases the Supreme Court confronted two other 
important Bill of Rights issues: freedom of speech and right to privacy. As for the 
!rst issue, one case seems to be a milestone, that is New York Times v. Sullivan39. It 
was a libel case against the newspaper which published an o"cial criticism of local 
municipal police. In 1964 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment pro-
tected the publication of all critical statements, even false ones, about the conduct 
of public o"cials except when the statements were made with knowledge that they 
were false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. #e Court thus provided 
new legal support for the right of citizens to criticize their public o"cials without 
fear of retaliatory libel actions. Time showed that Justices embarked upon a new era 
in the analysis of First Amendment issues40. A new era was also visible in the area of 
the privacy rights – problem which had been seldom raised by the Court before. 
However, the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut41 showed tendency of the Warren 
Court (developed later by the Burger Court) to enter the most personal and private 
sphere of the individuals. In Griswold the Justices confronted the question on the 
ability of counselling married couples in the use of contraceptives. In one of its most 
controversial decisions, the Supreme Court acknowledged the right to privacy in 
marital relations which derived from the Constitution. Although there was no such 
phrase as ‘right to privacy’ written in the document, the Justices interpreted it from 
the First, #ird, Fourth and Ninth Amendments together. 
#e greatest number of cases decided by the Warren Court concerning individual 
rights and liberties did not relate to the First Amendment’s issues, but to disputes 
over the rights of the accused in criminal procedure. Since 1961 to 1968 the Justices 
had adjudicated in several cases questioning the role of penal prosecution agencies 
(state police, federal agents, the prosecutors and attorneys), expanding the rights of 
suspects and the accused. #ese so-called procedural due process cases42 dominated 
the second part of Earl Warren’s leadership in the Court and set rules, some of which 
have become controversial and disputable. By protecting the rights of individuals in 
39 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
40 See: William Hachten, Supreme Court on the Freedom of the Press: Decisions and Dis-
sents, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1968, p. 307. Edward V. Heck, Albert C. Ringelstein, 
!e Burger Court and the Primacy of Political Expression, “Western Political Quarterly”, 
vol. 40, no. 3, 1987, p. 413–425. 
41 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42 Due process of law is an important clause of U.S. Constitution and one may !nd it 
twice in the document: in the Fi$h and Fourteenth Amendment. #anks to judicial inter-
pretation there are two kinds of due process: procedural (assuring the fair justice system) and 
substantive (assuring proper legislation by the state). See: John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Ro-
tunda, Constitutional Law, St. Paul: West Group, 2000, p. 398–501, 544–631. 
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the courts the Supreme Court gave a sign that it would not approve of any formal 
errors made by the police or prosecution. !ese judgements marked a new era in the 
Court’s doctrinal decisionmaking which is o"en called “due process model era”43.
!e most debatable decisions of that time were Mapp v. Ohio44 and Miranda 
v. Arizona45. In the #rst one the Supreme Court confronted the issue of admissibility 
of evidence in the criminal trial. Dolree Mapp was convicted of possessing illegal 
obscene magazines which were found during police search; the search, however, was 
intended to #nd a fugitive, not the materials mentioned. !e Justices, interpreting 
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, created exclusionary rule (or the rule of 
the fruit of the poisonous tree) which meant inadmissibility of illegaly obtained evi-
dence in criminal cases. Evidence obtained without a legally approved search warrant 
had to be excluded from the court, thus weakening the prosecution’s case and allow-
ing the accused to enjoy broad protection from the American system of justice. 
Similar e$ect brought the Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona when the Justices 
had to decide upon constitutionality of actions of the policemen who did not read 
the arrested person his rights. In a narrow judgement the Supreme Court admitted 
the arrested and the accused constitutional safeguards such as the right to counsel 
or right to remain silent, which had to be o%cialy presented to them by the police. 
So-called Miranda warnings changed the process of arresting suspects and forced 
the police to act very formally and delicatly with individuals, who could now enjoy 
the safeguards mentioned from the moment of arrest until the end of the trial.
Other decisions in criminal justice cases made by the Warren Court had rather 
been expected by the American society for a long time. It is worth to mention espe-
cially two precedents: Gideon v. Wainwright46 and Duncan v. Louisiana47 because they 
con#rmed the right of the defendant to have assistance of counsel in every stage of 
criminal trial and right to a trial by jury, meaning an impartial body of laymen decid-
ing upon guilt or innocence. !e Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment to 
the Constitution allowed the accused to have legal help from state-appointed counsel 
(in case of unability of appointing their own attorney) and to enjoy a jury trial which 
became one of the most fundamental safeguards from possible partisanship and bias 
of the trial judge. Other decisions worth mentioning, in which the Warren Court gave 
a new meaning to the criminal defendants’ rights, were Katz v. United States48 (“the 
43 Tadeusz Tomaszewski, Proces amerykański. Problematyka śledcza, Wydawnictwo 
COMER, 1996. 
44 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
47 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
48 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Fourth Amendment protects people not places”, telephone tapping case) and Terry v. 
Ohio49 (probable cause, limitations to exclusionary rule). It proves Warren Court’s 
desire to follow the doctrinal due process model and protect individuals from the 
oppression of the state. Security? Yes. But rather inner than outer. 
New era of civil rights’ protection meant that the Supreme Court acknowledged 
a social need for such protection. According to Bernard Schwartz this era marked 
one of the two great creative periods in American public law.50 Regardless of outer 
fears and national security threats, the Justices realized that people must feel secure 
within the borders of their country, and expecially secure from arbitrary and unlaw-
ful actions of the government. Some of the decisions seemed obvious and were 
awaited by the majority of American society (Brown v. Board of Education, Gideon 
v. Wainwright, Duncan v. Lousiana), others, however, became more controversial 
and triggered a nationwide discussion about their legitimacy and fairness (Miranda 
v. Arizona, Mapp v. Ohio, Griswold v. Connecticut). !e question arose whether the 
accused in criminal procedure did not enjoy too broad protection under the Con-
stitution (interpreted by the Supreme Court), what could lead in e"ect to disturbances 
in the feeling of security of the rest of the community. Others raised the problem of 
constitutional meanings and roots of the right to privacy which had been de#ned by 
the Supreme Court so broadly for the #rst time in history. No matter what contem-
porary attitude towards these ruling would be, it is worth mentioning that the 
Supreme Court transformed during the #rst twenty years of the Cold War, from an 
institution that was dominated by the national security concerns, to an institution 
that became concerned about fundamental values of the society, such as civil rights 
and liberties. !is transformation was initiated by the change of the Supreme Court’s 
leadership in 1953, but its origins may be found even in the late 40s of the 20th 
century. As Justice Felix Frankfurter stated in Adamson v. California51 (decision 
upholding a statute that allowed for the prosecution to call to the jury’s attention the 
defendant’s refusal of testimony): “no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges 
and protections of the Bill of Rights, regardless of community or national values52.” 
However, as time showed, the next six years were dominated by political and social 
fear of Communism destroying basic American national values. In this dimension, 
the in$uence of the Cold War on judicial rulings was more than obvious. 
49 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
50 !e other was the Marshall Court era (1803–1835). See: Bernard Schwartz, !e His-
tory…, p. 263. 
51 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
52 Ibidem.
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Cass R. Sustein notices that “when national security con!icts with individual 
liberty, reviewing courts might adopt one of three general orientations: national 
security maximalism, liberty maximalism, and minimalism”53. In his opinion the 
most appealing approach is minimalism, which may be observed in the Supreme 
Court’s decisions made during the Cold War period. Sustein explains this approach 
as a necessity of the courts to give narrow, incompletely theorized rulings, upholding 
on one hand presidential actions (but only these which have clear congressional 
authorization) and on the other judging in favor of individuals who have been 
deprived of their procedural rights and freedoms. Analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
docket since 1947 to 1969, it is important to add that minimalistic the approach is 
closer to security maximalism during the times of the Vinson Court and closer to 
liberty maximalism during the times of the Warren Court. 
One should not consider the Vinson Court as an institution which did not defend 
the rights of the individuals – decisions in Sweatt v. Painter54 and McLaurin v. Okla-
homa State of Regents55 showed positive attitude of the Justices towards destroying 
the racial barriers and limitations in public facilities. But it was the Warren Court 
which broke up with the separation but equal doctrine and this court will be remem-
bered for numeorus decisions concerning civil rights issues. One may observe that 
the tensions of the "rst years of the Cold War did not allow the Vinson Court to deal 
with cases di#erent than the national security issues. However, no one forced the 
Justices to sustain most of the controversial political decisions of that time, for what 
the Vinson Court shall be remembered. Some say Frederick M. Vinson was the worst 
Chief Justice in history56, but one should admit that the years during which he was 
to hold his post were extraordinary and strange. $e Red Image dominated political 
and social life of the country thus in!uencing the Supreme Court’s docket. When 
the tensions diminished the Court could get down to shaping new meaning of civil 
rights and civil liberties. And it was Earl Warren’s vision of preserving national 
values and providing for inner security; vision which was admired by other Justices.57 
53 Cass R. Sustein, Minimalism at War. “Supreme Court Review” (forthcoming), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=629285 (01.06.2007).
54 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
55 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
56 Peter Irons, A People’s History of the Supreme Court…, p. 367; Bernard Schwartz, e 
History…, p. 253.
57 Justice William Douglas ranks Earl Warren with John Marshall and Charles Evans 
Hughes „as three greatest Chief Justices”. See: William O. Douglas, e Cort Years 1939–1975, 
New York: Random House, 1974, p. 240.
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What seems interesting, both Chief Justices proved to have di!erent legal and social 
attitude and leadership skills, despite being chosen for their posts for similar reasons: 
friendship and gratitude.58 In case of Earl Warren positive relations with the President 
did not last long and even changed into hostility – Eisenhower stated several times, 
that nomination of Warren was his biggest political mistake. "e major reason of 
that was Chief Justice’s willingness to improve the laws governing racial inequality, 
especially the segregation issues (a situation which the President had to get used to, 
despite his reluctance). 
"ere is no doubt that the Cold War period created a con#ict between the protec-
tion of civil rights and liberties and the need to protect national security59. "e 
problem of fear versus security existed in both terms in question, but in my opinion 
the concept of fear in the late 40s was directly related to ideological threats of Com-
munism, and it transformed in the late 50s and early 60s into the concept of fear 
from limitations set by the government to the rights of individuals. "e events which 
took place at the very beginning of the Cold War justi$ed the Court’s rulings against 
civil rights, but such justi$cation could not last long. I think that crucial decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education marked a new era of adjudication in the name of 
American society $ghting to secure its rights and freedoms. One may observe at the 
same time indirect e!ect of the Brown decision on national security – by setting racial 
equality the government achieved international approval necessary during the tense 
period. As Mary L. Dudziak noticed, the best way to $ght the Cold War was the 
implementation of civil rights reforms.60 As a result, the Justices con$rmed that the 
inscription Equal Justice under Law, which is situated above the entrance to the 
Supreme Court’s building, should become the main motto of the nation’s system of 
justice, as well as a guarantee that there will be less fear and more security. "e 
question occurs, whether right now, in the 21st century, the Supreme Court will not 
58 Dwight Eisenhower selected Earl Warren for the O%ce, in part because of the debt 
owed for Warren’s crucial support of Eisenhower’s cause in the 1952 Republican Convention. 
As Governor of California and leader of that state’s delegation, Warren had provided needed 
votes on a preliminary issue concerning contested state delegates. See: Lawrence Baum, !e 
Supreme Court, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1985, p. 42. For reasons of Vinson’s ap-
pointment see footnote 12. 
59 "e same problem is confronted right now by the American society when some of the 
provisions of U.S.A. Patriot Act seem to violate the Constitution. See: Andrzej Mania, Pawel 
Laidler, Controversy over the U.S.A. Patriot Act, “"e Polish Quarterly of International A!airs”, 
vol. 13, no. 3, 2004, p. 52–64. 
60 Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights. Race and the Image of American Democracy, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 79–114.
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follow the Vinson’s Court’s approach while deciding cases that concern a new threat 
to American values and freedoms: the terrorism? For sure many things done in the 
Cold War era in security’s name would not have been tolerated in di!erent times. 
What times do we have now? One should wait and observe decisions of the contem-
porary Supreme Court to "nd the exact answer. 
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